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We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its 
evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of 
political economy. The first ones extend the theory of regulation with incomplete 
information to address privatization issues, comparing State Owned Entreprises (SOEs) 
with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may either derive from the 
constraints it places on malevolent agents or to the impossibility of commitment by a 
benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with 
political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either 
explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyze the impact of 
privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results 
regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive 
conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes 
place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain. 
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Over recent decades privatization policies have been implemented
all over the world1 and the economic literature devoted to privatization
issues has been constantly increasing2. According to the common wis-
dom, goverments implement privatization policies in order to achive the
following goals: 1) to reduce national budget deﬁcits and the stock of
national debt 2) to foster ﬁnancial markets development 3) to increase
eﬃciency. Concerning the ﬁrst objective, the privatization of the State
Owned Enterprises (from now on SOEs) obviously implicates a reduction
in government expenditure due to subsidies. Moreover, if after privati-
zation former SOEs become and remain more proﬁtable, they can also
help increase tax revenues. Further, experience has shown that priva-
tization revenues do not lead to an increase in government spending,
because they are considered a once and for all yield and are earmarked
to reduce the stock of national debt. As to the second objective, current
experience is consistent with a positive impact of privatization policies
on ﬁnancial market development. Empirical analyses show that privati-
zation has contributed to the growth of stock market capitalization and
trading all over the world (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The third aim
can be considered more controversial. Conventional wisdom assumes
that privatization policies contribute to increase eﬃciency given that a
huge amount of resources is moved from government control to market
allocation. However such a “popular” belief may be due to ideological
faith on the virtues of economic liberalism rather than to a proper assess-
ment of the impact of the ﬁrm’s ownership on productive and allocative
eﬃciency.
Empirical studies show that ownership changes increase eﬃciency
in competitive markets, but are less conclusive when considering the
pure eﬀects of privatization alone (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Board-
man and Vining 1992, Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 2003). According to
Megginson and Netter (2001), privately owned ﬁrms are generally more
eﬃcient than otherwise comparable SOEs. However, improvements in
productive eﬃciency do not necessarily also imply an increase in al-
locative eﬃciency. In the Eastern European countries privatization has
occurred during their transition to market economies. In Western coun-
tries privatization has been frequently accompanied by liberalization and
regulatory changes, as far as public utilities markets are concerned. In
both cases, it may be diﬃcult to disentangle the pure eﬀect of ownership
1See Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) for an international analysis.
2This literature has been extensively reviewed in Megginson and Netter (2001).
Other surveys can be found in Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004), Sheshinski and Lopez-
Calva (2003), Shirley and Walsh (2004).
2changes from the impact of the evolution of market structure.
Together with empirical studies, the theoretical literaure dealing with
the relationship between privatization and eﬃciency has been growing
over the last twenty years. Moreover, the theoretical results are ambiva-
lent about the impact of ownership changes on eﬃciency. Although this
literature has been rapidly reviewed in most empirical studies devoted
to privatization policies, to the best of our knowledge, there is no survey
in economic literature focusing exclusively on theoretical studies deal-
ing with the impact of privatization policies on eﬃciency. Such studies
could be useful in assessing the pure eﬀect of ownership changes and
would show a gradual shift from normative to positive analysis, as the
focus of attention moves from the theory of incentives with incomplete
information to political economy issues. The latter are obviously at the
core of privatization decisions despite the fact that they have been only
recently analyzed by the theoretical literature.
In this survey section two reviews the seminal papers based on agency
theory. We show how theoretical analysis evolved from studies where
privatization beneﬁts are linked to the assumption of a malevolent gov-
ernment to other contributions showing how these beneﬁts instead derive
from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government, due
to incomplete contracts. Most studies reviewed in the second section
compare SOEs with private regulated ﬁrms and are based on the theory
of regulation with imperfect information. In section three regulatory
topics are ignored and analysis is focused on political economy issues.
Section four concludes.
2 Privatization and Principal-Agent Theory
The initial contributions to the theoretical literature on privatization
and eﬃciency can be considered as extensions of the Principal-Agent
theory to ownership issues. The seminal paper was by Sappington and
Stiglitz (1987). In considering an auction system between potential pro-
ducers for the right to provide a good they extend the analysis already
developed by Loeb and Magat (1979) to privatization issues and inves-
tigate optimal regulation with asymmetric information. According to
Sappington and Stiglitz, both private and public production are similar
because they are characterized by a process of delegation of authority
and responsability to managers3. The authors compare SOEs with pri-
vate ﬁrms on the basis of their “fundamental privatization theorem”,
providing conditions under which ownership does not matter, as public
production cannot improve upon private production. Their theorem is
3One can think about a hierarchy of authority that ends with managers.
3the ﬁrst of the three “indiﬀerence results” characterizing the literaure
about privatization and its eﬃciency eﬀects. From the methodological
point of view this result (and its implications) is similar to the funda-
mental theorems of welfare economics. It states the conditions under
which private ﬁrms can perform as well as public ﬁrms in order to ﬁnd
“privatization failures” which require government intervention in pro-
duction.
According to the fundamental privatization theorem, any government
aiming to reach eﬃciency and equity goals (including rent extraction)
can always delegate production decisions to a private ﬁrm through an
auction system4, provided that some ideal assumptions concerning in-
formation, risk-aversion and collusion are respected. Potential produc-
ers (agents) must be risk-neutral and characterized by symmetric beliefs
about the least-cost production technology. Actual costs are only learned
after the right to produce has been awarded. The government (principal)
is not aware of the production technology but has a “social” valuation
V (z) regarding the amount of output z to be produced, including eq-
uity goals and externality eﬀects. The government auctions oﬀ the right
to receive a compensation scheme P(z)=V (z) for production, thereby
equalizing the optimization problem of the ﬁrm, conditional on the cost
realization, with social surplus maximization. In this manner a ﬁrst best
is achieved. Moreover, given that the right to produce and obtain com-
pensation P(z) is awarded to the ﬁrm with the highest bid, the auction
process will select the ﬁrm with the lowest expected costs. No rents will
then accrue to the private ﬁrm through the bidding process, also consid-
ering that prior beliefs about the production technology are simmetric
among potential producers.
However if one relaxes the assumptions characterizing the “ideal set-
ting” described by Sappington and Stiglitz, privatization failures emerge,
as eﬃciency and equity goals can no longer be achieved. For example
rent extraction is limited by risk-aversion, scarce competition among po-
tential bidders and by an informed principal. When potential producers
are risk-neutral, the government does not need to pay risk premia to
them, even though they may be poorly informed about the technology
a n dt h e nq u i t eu n c e r t a i na b o u tt h e i rﬁnal compensation. If potential
producers have better information but are risk-averse, the government
faces a trade-oﬀ because awarding the right to produce to the most in-
formed party would be eﬃcient, but at the same time a risk premium
must be paid to the agent, so that the rents will accrue to him. The gov-
4Assuming increasing returns to scale, it would be optimal to select just one
private producer, so that the framework developed by Sappington and Stiglitz can
be adapted to public intervention in industries characterized by a natural monopoly.
4ernment could share the risk with the ﬁrm to reduce compensation, but
in this case the incentive for eﬃcient performance would be reduced. In
contrast, with no risk sharing on the part of the government, the winner
of the auction could be the least risk-averse producer, but not necessarily
t h em o s te ﬃcient one.
This kind of privatization failures could be invoked to explain wide-
spread State intervention when production is risky because the technol-
ogy is new and related capital investments are huge: early electriﬁcation
or the development of railroads could be well known examples, but so
would government involvment in the European aircraft industry. More-
over in very risky businesses the fear of defaults increases capital cost
for private producers, while SOEs could carry out such investments with
lower ﬁnancial costs. Sappington and Stiglitz show that privatization
failures can also arise because of contracting costs, liability limits and
problems associated with contract implementation. However the rem-
edy need not necessarily be SOEs. The transaction costs associated with
government intervention can be considered ap r i o r ismaller in a public
ﬁrm than in a private ﬁrm. However, identifying the costs and beneﬁts
of direct public intervention imposed developing a theory of Government
behaviour. However such a theory was far from being developed until the
most recent contributions to the ﬁeld of political economy appeared. Ac-
cording to Sappington and Stiglitz, the dichotomy between privatization
and nationalization had to be overcome and the following alternative so-
lutions needed to be considered: a) outsourcing5 if the production is such
to avoid privatization failures (an “ideal setting” prevails) b) regulation
of private producers even when they are selected through an auction
mechanism, if privatization failures are more likely, but market failures
like natural monopoly are at stake. Regulation is associated with “inter-
mediate” transaction costs, providing a remedy for privatization failures
while avoiding the costs associated to nationalization at the same time6.
After the seminal work by Sappington and Stiglitz the literaure has
focused on the comparison between SOEs and private regulated ﬁrms,
implicitly considering direct ownership as an alternative to external reg-
ulation by State authorities. These contributions examine more sophis-
ticated regulatory mechanisms to deal with asymmetric information be-
tween the ﬁrm and the regulator. In particular, they exploit the previous
result by Baron and Myerson (1982) that we summarise in Appendix 1,
5Outsourcing of some services by SOEs or by public departments frequently in-
volves very simple production technologies and very competitive activities that can
reﬂect the “ideal setting” of Sappington and Stiglitz.
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Figure 1: Relathionships between principals and agents in public and
private enterprise
as reference to this result it is essential to appreciate the diﬀerent models
that will be surveyed in the next subsection7. However among all the
contributions based on the theory of regulation with asymmetric infor-
mation we can further distinguish those studies that are based on the
assumption of a “malevolent” government (subsection 2.1) from those
that are not and ﬁnd privatization beneﬁts by studying commitment
issues when contracts are incomplete (subsection 2.2).
2.1 Privatization with “malevolent” agents
According to Shapiro and Willig (1990), the main diﬀerence between
SOEs and regulated private ﬁrms lies in the information ﬂows in the
framework of hierarchical relationships among public oﬃcials (i.e. min-
isters or regulators, private owners and managers, due to the strategic
use of private information. The vertical relationships between princi-
pals and agents considered in their analysis are represented in Figure 1.
We shall refer to this framework as a useful benchmark to also discuss
further contributions to literature.
At the head of the hierarchical relationships there is a framer,w h o
is a public spirited agent that originally chooses to operate production
7For a recent and uniﬁed analysis of economic models dealing with regulation in
the framework of imperfect information the interested reader can see Armstrong and
Sappington (2004).
6with SOEs or with private regulated ﬁrms with the aim of maximizing
social welfare:
W = S(z,µ)+λΠ(z,θ) (1)
where z is the output level and µ and θ are two parameters represent-
ing diﬀerent kinds of private information related to the external social
beneﬁto ft h eﬁrm’s activity and to its proﬁtability respectively. The
contribution of ﬁrm proﬁts Π(z,θ) to overall social welfare is ampliﬁed
by λ>1, that may alternatively represent the unit beneﬁts of avoided
taxes to the Treasury - if net proﬁts are positive - or the unit cost of
raising public funds if there are losses to be covered by government sub-
sidies. Although Shapiro and Willig do not characterize it further, we
suggest that the framer could easily represent a benevolent parliamen-
tary majority - operating on behalf of its constituency - that delegates
administrative power either to a minister - if a SOE has been chosen - or
to a regulator controlling the owners of the private ﬁrm. θ is unknown
at the time the framer must choose between a public or a private ﬁrm.
The framer only knows that θ is distributed on the interval [θ1,θ 2] with
a probability function f (θ) and cumulative distribution function F (θ).
In contrast, managers at the end of the chain have private information
θ about the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. They either report this information di-
rectly to the minister - if they run a SOE - or to the owners of the
private ﬁrm in the opposite case. Finally, by virtue of their position, the
minister and the regulator observe the public interest impact variable µ.
Shapiro and Willig are not interested in analyzing the agency re-
lationship between managers and their principals (minister or private
owners). The main assumption that drives the results of the model is
that public oﬃcials, i.e. the minister or regulator, have the following
objective function:
V = W + γJ(z,ε) (2)
including not only overall social welfare but also the function J(z,ε),r e p -
resenting their private agenda that can be satisﬁed on the basis of both
the ﬁrm’s output and the private information ε about the divergence
between social and private aims, and the extent to which the political
system allows public oﬃcials to pursue their private goals, measured by
the parameter γ8. The advantage of SOEs is the absence of agency costs
for the minister, as it is assumed the manager completely reports θ to
8Shapiro and Willig do not explore regulation issues further. The fact that a
regulator could have a private agenda could suggest the idea of regulatory capture.
7him. In contrast, with private regulated ﬁrms θ is reported by the man-
ager to the private owners so that the regulator then faces an information
revelation problem. He must choose an appropriate regulation scheme
based on transfers T(z) to motivate the private ﬁrm. Finding the opti-
mal regulatory contract implies solving a second best problem analogous
to that analyzed by Baron and Myerson (1982), reported in Appendix
1. Therefore, given the cost of public funds, transfers are information
rents that must be minimized, at the cost of output reductions for the
less proﬁtable ﬁrm.
T h ea g e n c yc o s to fr e g u l a t i n gap r i v a t eﬁrm with asymmetric infor-
mation implies not only a reduction in payoﬀs for both the public-spirited
framer and the regulator - corresponding to the public tranfers T(z) -
but also output distorsions compared to the public enterprise solution.
However agency costs can also imply privatization beneﬁts in that out-
put distorsions also aﬀect the private agenda of the public oﬃcial that,
as a malevolent regulator, now ﬁnds more diﬃcult to reach his private
goals. Given that the public-spirited framer may want to put constraints
on malevolent public oﬃcials that pursue their own private agenda, pri-
vatization represents a useful information barrier because a completely
informed minister is transformed into a less informed regulator9.
Shapiro e Willig can then reach their “indiﬀerence result” concern-
ing SOEs and regulated private ﬁrms, stating that ownership is neutral
from the point of view of social welfare if private information about prof-
itability is irrelevant or there are no costs from raising public funds10.
In contrast, if the latter are positive and there is private information
on ﬁrm proﬁtability, privatization can increase eﬃciency if agency bene-
ﬁts outweigh agency costs. The economic rationale behind privatization
then depends on the weight of private information about the ﬁrm’s prof-
itability and on the performance of the political system in its ability to
constrain the behavior of public oﬃcials. Hence, greater privatization
beneﬁts will accrue to countries with more corruption because of their
ﬂawed political system.
The case of nondiscretionary governance systems is also considered.
If public oﬃcials (i.e. minister or regulator) have no information about
the social value of production, where this kind of information is com-
9In the case of regulated ﬁrms, it is as if the government commits himself to
respect private property rights to information (see subsection 2.2).
10With private information on ﬁrm proﬁtability and no cost of raising public funds
the regulatory solution suggested by Loeb and Magat could be implemented through
franchise auctions as suggested by Sappington and Stiglitz. No output distortions
would arise, eliminating then both agency costs and agency beneﬁts. To justify
public production the privatization failures listed by Sappington and Stiglitz should
be invoked.
8pletly controlled by the framer, then the framer himself will ﬁnd it con-
venient to give them no discretion in order to maximize social welfare.
However such a conclusion obviously depends on the assumption of a
public-spirited framer. For example, a malevolent framer may want to
reduce the discretion of an independent (benevolent) regulator prevent-
ing him from using the control of the ﬁrm to pursue his own private
agenda. In this case the social beneﬁt of reducing regulatory discretion
may be questioned11.
As noted above, agency relationships between ﬁrm owners and man-
agers are neglected by Shapiro and Willig. This kind of relationships lie
at the core of Principal-Agent theory and are very important to study
w h e nt h ea i m so ft h eo w n e r sd i v e r g ef r o mt h o s eo ft h em a n a g e r .A tt h e
simplest level, it can be assumed that managerial utility is a function of
income and eﬀort. As a monitoring problem arises, an optimal contract
to constrain manager behavior and avoid slack should be designed. This
kind of problem raises the issue of productive eﬃciency that should be
considered together with allocative eﬃciency when evaluating privati-
zation policies. Pint’s analysis (1991) integrates Shapiro and Willig’s
model by exploring managers behavior in the framework of alternative
regulatory mechanisms aﬀecting a natural monopoly that could be either
privatized or nationalized. The payoﬀ function of the manager (indepen-
dent of the ownership structure) is separable on his salary w(.) and slack
δ:
U = ϑδ + g(w(.)) (3)
being ϑ the costant marginal utility of slack. When expressing the pro-
duction function as a labor requirement function L(z,K,θ),o n ec a ns e e
that the manager can exploit his private information regarding the tech-
nological parameter θ and his hidden action regarding the combination
between capital and labor (K/L), to report excessive labor requirements
in order to ﬁnance his slack with an information rent12. Therefore, one
should design an optimal incentive contract so that the manager gets
11Attempts by political majorities to reduce the regulatory discretion of indepen-
dent regulators may be explained by the persitence of Treasury stakes in partially
privatized ﬁrms whose value can be aﬀected by parliamentary decisions aiming to
allow greater rate of returns on the ﬁrms’ assets. Empirical evidence consistent with
this phenomenon is shown by Bortolotti and Faccio (2004) and discussed in section
3.
12Without any incentive compatible contract the manager would ﬁnd it convenient























Therefore the manager would be able to ﬁnance his slack δ by saving labor with re-



























9the level of salary and information rent enabling him to report the true
θ. However private and public owners diﬀer in terms of their payoﬀ func-
tions. The private ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁts, given the price
of labor ¯ w and the price of capital i:
max
K(θ),z(θ),δ(θ),w(θ)
Eθ {p(z (θ))z (θ) − iK (θ) − ¯ wL(z,K,θ) − δ(θ) − w(θ)}
(4)
In contrast, the government, being a vote seeker, operates the public




Eθ {α1S (.)+α2Π(.)+α3 ¯ wL(.)} (5)
where αi > 0( i =1 ,2,3) is the weight given to each component of
its payoﬀ function, i.e. the consumers surplus, the SOE proﬁta n dt h e
total amount of workers salaries (under the assumption that all workers
belong to the government constituency)13.
Due to the incentive issues arising from agency problems between
owners and managers, only second best eﬃciency can be achieved by
both types of ﬁrms. As the government is biased towards labor and con-
sumer surplus, the manager of a nationalized ﬁrm is expected to receive
higher information rents in order to respect his incentive compatibil-
ity constraint at larger level of output. He therefore receives a higher
salary and enjoys more slack. Consequently, the distorsion of the na-
tionalized ﬁrm towards the use of excessive labor reduces its productive
eﬃciency. In contrast, SOEs may be relatively more eﬃcient from the
allocative point of view as they care more about consumer surplus. How-
ever when the weight given to consumer surplus in the payoﬀ function of
the government is excessive, the output level will exceed the second best
benchmark. Privatized ﬁrms may also be ineﬃcient from the productive
point of view because of Rate of Return regulation. Due to the Averch-
Johnson eﬀect (1962), their productive choice is biased towards capital.





13In his model, Pint neglects the distinction between the framer and the public
oﬃcial and does not consider the choice between public and private ﬁrm. He only
compares these two kinds of natural monopoly. However, following Shapiro and
Willig, in the nazionalized ﬁrm we can consider a (malevolent) vote seeker framer
coinciding with the (malevolent) public owner. In this case, the latter would also
be a regulator given the agency problem with the manager. In this manner Pint
identiﬁes the private agenda with the electoral support. As regards the private ﬁrm,
the public, but politically independent regulatory agency can adopt either ROR or
price-cap mechanisms.
10In contrast, when incentive mechanisms like price-caps are adopted, pri-
vatized ﬁrms are more eﬃcient from the productive point of view, as
they can select the eﬃcient K/L ratio.
One of the results of privatization policies is that managerial incen-
tives could also be positively aﬀected by the market for corporate con-
trol. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) emphasize that disperse share ownership
can reduce the eﬀectiveness of shareholder monitoring over managers,
but takeover bids can concentrate ownership and eliminate externali-
ties associated with multiple holdings. Takeover threats can operate as
an incentive mechanism for managers towards internal eﬃciency, but
could also negatively aﬀe c tm a n a g e rp e r f o r m a n c eb yr a i s i n gt h er a t ea t
which managers discount future utility as the likelyhood of a takeover
increases. Furthermore takeover activity may be motivated by diﬀerent
factors other than capital gains - like market power or the reduction of
tax liabilities - so that even an eﬃcient management can become subject
to it. Consequently, the incentives to pursue eﬃcieny based on takeover
threats turn out to be weakened. We shall not developed this argument
further as the wide literature on corporate governance that can oﬀer ad-
ditional insights is beyond the scope of this review14. Not only takeovers,
but also bankruptcy threats may become an incentive for managers of
private ﬁrms, while SOEs risk becoming less eﬃcient because of soft
budget constraints. This issue will be analyzed in the next subsection.
2.2 Privatization with incomplete contracts
One weakness of the contributions reviewed above is that the beneﬁts
of privatization depend on the crucial assumption of a malevolent gov-
ernment. To strengthen privatization gains, subsequents contributions
assume a completely benevolent government, but emphasize that agency
relationships are characterized by incomplete contracts. In this frame-
work the government faces unavoidable commitment issues that can ex-
plain the advantages of privatization policies. Due to bounded rational-
ity and the excessive cost of listing each speciﬁcr i g h to v e rt h eﬁrms’
assets, contracts are frequently incomplete and property rights matter
because they give the owner the authority to dispose of the ﬁrm’s assets
in any event. Grossman and Hart (1986) have shown that when unfore-
seen contingiencies arise within contractual relationships, the residual
decision rights are implicit in ownership.
Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) compare private and public ﬁrms in the
framework of incomplete contracts by extending their previous model of
regulation with incomplete information (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1986). They
14The literature concerning the relationship between corporate governance and
privatization issues is surveyed in Megginson and Netter (2001).
11consider the following cost function c = θ − e,b e i n ge the managerial
eﬀort associated with cost reduction activities. According to the infor-
mation structure, the regulator knows c and thus disposes of a further
signal to infer the value of θ, that remains uncertain. However cost re-
ducing activities represent a hidden action from the regulator’s point of
view (as already seen in Pint moral hazard issues add to adverse selec-
tion problems). Therefore regulated ﬁrms can increase their information
rents vis à vis regulator by reducing productive eﬃciency, as actually
occurs in the second best solution of the model. If we consider Shapiro
and Willig (1990) as the usual benchmark (see Figure 1), we can state
that, together with Pint, Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) also analyze the
agency relationships between owners and the manager who bears the
eﬀort cost ψ(e) and is informed about the cost parameter θ.H o w e v e r
the authors point out that private regulated ﬁrms are characterized by
multiple agency problems because their managers are controlled by two
principals: shareholders and the regulator. The objectives of the two
principals may diﬀe ra n dw h e no ﬀering incentive compatible contracts
to the agent, neither shareholders nor the regulator internalize the aims
of the other principal in their own agency problem.
The ineﬃciency resulting from the multiple agency problem repre-
sents the cost of private ownership, when the latter is separated from
managerial control and ﬁrms are regulated. In contrast, the cost of
public ownership depends on the reduced incentive to invest faced by
SOEs managers. According to Laﬀont and Tirole, SOEs managers fear
that their noncontractible investments may be expropriated ex post by
the government to achieve social goals. In fact, due to contract incom-
pleteness, the government cannot commit ex ante not to expropriate
investment ex post because in SOEs it possesses the residual property
rights on the ﬁrm’s assets. The investment quoted by Laﬀont and Tirole
may range from cost reducing activities to ﬁrm facilities (club goods re-
served to ﬁrm managers). After building a new plant, the government
may decide ex post to force the ﬁrm to hire excess labor, thus reducing
the rate of return on this investment (or grant access to the ﬁrm’s facil-
ities - once reserved to ﬁrm managers - to the entire population). What
is important to point out here is that the decision of the government
to redeploy ﬁrm’s investments to social goals may be socially optimal
ex post, but managers’ fears about investment expropriation may lead
them to decide not to invest at all ex ante15. This is the cost of public
ownership.
15Laﬀont and Tirole assume that shareholders will not expropriate the investment
of the manager, because they have no incentive to reallocate its associated beneﬁts
to outsiders.
12As stated above, by comparing ownership structures in their model,
Laﬀont and Tirole ﬁnd that managerial eﬀort is lower in regulated private
ﬁrms. However their insights about privatization and eﬃciency may lead
to ambiguous results, as they suggest in their conclusions. According to
the authors, neglecting regulatory capture and considering the govern-
ment as a single principal could limit the analysis. One may recall that
both issues were dealt with in Shapiro-Willig’s contribution where the
regulator had a private agenda and the government was separated from
the framer.
Unlike Shapiro and Willig, Schmidt (1996a) considers a model where
the framer and the goverment coincide, so that the latter has to decide
between nationalization and privatization. If the ﬁrm is nationalized
then the government becomes the owner while in the case of privati-
zation the ﬁrm is auctioned, the government keeps the revenues, and
becomes a less informed regulator. As in Laﬀont and Tirole, a benevo-
lent government is assumed and the agency relationship between owners
and the manager is explored to derive conclusions regarding productive
and allocative eﬃciency. According to Schmidt, the manager has a pref-
erence for higher output levels, enabling him to obtain higher budgets,
and dislikes eﬀorts to minimize costs. By assumption ψ(e)=e and
θ ∈ [θ1,θ 2] represents the cost parameter (θ2 >θ 1). The manager’s ef-
fort aﬀects costs stocastically: with probability pr(e), θ = θ1 and with
probability 1 − pr(e), θ = θ2. As in Shapiro and Willig, inside SOEs
both the manager and the government know θ. In fact, the access to cost
information is a residual right pertaining to ownership. When the ﬁrms
is privatized the government loses access to cost information together
with ownership and simply knows the distribution of θ, a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
probabilities shown above.
In his model, Schmidt is concerned with the issue of the soft budget
constraint16. Inside SOEs managers have weaker incentives to minimize
costs, as ex ante government threats to reduce output and shut down
the ﬁrm in case of high costs (θ = θ2) are not credible. Given that a
(benevolent) government would maximize social welfare, even when it
observes a higher costs level (implying a lower e) a manager’s incentives
would not lead him to reduce output ex post. In other words, given con-
tract incompleteness, the government cannot commit ex ante to reduce
output to punish the manager even when it realizes there are higher
costs. As a consequence, the likelyhood of slack is higher in SOEs. In
practice governments will continue to bail out ineﬃcient SOEs.
If the ﬁrm is privatized, the government no longer observes θ,a n d
faces the usual problem of regulation with incomplete information. As-
16The concept of soft budget constraint was introduced by Kornai (1986).
13suming that a regulatory scheme àl aBaron-Myerson is implemented, an
ineﬃcient manager would automatically be punished because if θ = θ2
the regulatory contract would imply reductions in output with respect
to the ﬁrst best. Therefore the empire builder manager operating in
the private ﬁrm regulated àl aBaron-Myerson is induced to put all his
eﬀorts into minimizing costs to increase the likelyhood that θ = θ1.
When comparing nationalization and privatization Schmidt ﬁnds a
higher level of productive eﬃciency in private ﬁrms while allocative eﬃ-
ciency is greater in SOEs17.When implementing privatization policies, a
benevolent government commits himself not to have access to cost infor-
mation to harden budget constraints. Therefore, privatization works as
an informational barrier as in Shapiro and Willig, but without the need
to introduce the assumption of a malevolent government. However, as
S c h m i d tp o i n t so u t ,i ft h e r ea r ew e l f a r eg a i n sf r o mp r i v a t i z a t i o np o l i c i e s
even in the case of a benevolent government, one can expect further
beneﬁts from privatizing SOEs if the goverment is malevolent. In order
to reinforce his previous results, in a subsequent paper Schmidt (1996b)
introduces the assumption that the private owner and the manager co-
incide, thus eliminating the preference of the latter for higher outputs.
His previous conclusions are also conﬁrmed in this new framework.
While it is reasonable to believe that the soft budget constraint nega-
tively aﬀects productive eﬃciency, one could also argue that such eﬀects
are not limited to SOEs. Governments may also decide to bail out inef-
ﬁcient private ﬁrms to preserve employment or protect national produc-
tion vis à vis foreign imports. Considering this issue, Segal (1998) goes
a step further than Schmidt by assuming that ﬁrms may even behave
strategically by choosing actions that lead to unproﬁtable production in
order to receive State subsidies, if the latter exceed the amount of prof-
its they can obtain from pursuing eﬃcient production decisions. Segal
considers the case of a monopolist, structurally receiving State subsidies
because of market failures that were driving down industry output. Such
a case could be consistent with the experience of many vertically inte-
grated public utilities considered as natural monopolies and owned by
the European States during the last century. However social issues may
also be related to full employement and thus be extended to industries
not necessarily characterised by market failures like natural monopoly.
Even if investments devoted to increase productive eﬃciency are not
costly, the ﬁrm that could receive State subsidies may prefer not to
carry out such investments and deliberately make its product costly or
17This result is similar to that found by Pint and at the same time is not in contrast
with that of Laﬀont and Tirole. If one considers a nazionalized ﬁrm then the manager
invests less in cost reduction or in redeployable assets respectively.
14unwanted by consumers, anticipating a bailout when the threat of shut
down becomes credible. In this case welfare is reduced by two eﬀects:
productive ineﬃciency and the social cost of public subsidies. More-
over, welfare reductions may even overcome the deadweight loss due to
monopolistic production.
Only if the State were able to write long term contracts with the mo-
nopolist, conditioning the subsidy on the ﬁrm’s decisions about produc-
tion and investments, could welfare costs be avoided. However contract
incompleteness generally prevents a full description of production and
future technology thereby also preventing intertemporal commitment on
these issues.
Segal suggests that governments can harden budget constraints by
credibly limiting the size of the State budget. He gives the equivalent
example of the inﬁnite social cost of public funds, but recent constraints
i m p o s e do nb u d g e td e ﬁcits in the European Union (together with caps
i m p o s e do nS t a t ea i dt on a t i o n a lﬁrms) are even better examples of cred-
ible commitments that could avoid the dissipation of social surplus by
subsidized monopolies. Another way to harden budget constraints would
be to introduce competition into the industry. In the case of public utili-
ties this implies breaking the vertical integrated utility by liberalization,
unbundling the monopolistic network from service provision where com-
petition may be sustainable. But in this case then one could ask whether
privatization is really necessary.
Lülfesmann (2002) points out that the government is ex post led to
bail out ineﬃcient private ﬁrms as well. In particular, he directs his
attention to regulated private ﬁrms, assuming that government remains
concerned with allocative eﬃciency even after privatization, pursuing
the aim of ﬁrst best eﬃciency as it does with SOEs (in this manner he
neglets the sophisticated regulatory schemes presented in the previous
section). Therefore commitment issues could not explain greater pro-
ductive eﬃciency in private ﬁrms. Lülfesmann shows instead that both
private and public owners may be induced to renegotiate the initial wage
contract with managers when technological conditions change and there
i sac r e d i b l et h r e a tt oq u i to rs h u td o w nt h eﬁrm. Given the hypothesis
of a pure benevolent government, the author concentrates on this kind of
renegotiation issues assuming that the owners and manager will equally
split the related surplus during the renegotiation phase (Nash bargaining
solution). However, as nationalised ﬁrms evaluate production more than
private ﬁrms (taking into account the consumer surplus), their managers
can obtain higher salaries. Such higher compensation represents a soft
budget constraint but, due to renegotiation opportunities, it does not
prevent the attainment of a ﬁrst best level of eﬀort. When production
15can be carried on only if an innovative production technology that dras-
tically reduces ﬁxed costs has been developed, productive eﬃciency may
be greater in public ﬁrms. Managers are led to place greater eﬀorts on
innovation because if they succeed, they will receive greater compensa-
tion during the renegotiation phase, while if they do not succeed the
ﬁrm will be shut down. Such an explanation may be consistent with
the heavy involvement of national government in the aerospace indus-
try, biotechnology or other risky and innovative businesses. In contrast,
when basic technologies are highly viable, productive eﬃciency can be
greater in private ﬁrms, but the result is independent of commitment
issues. Rather one could state that the budget constraints harden as
manager compensation only depends on proﬁts and they do not overin-
vest in eﬀort.
Like Sappington and Stiglitz, Schleifer (1998) conceives privatiza-
tion as outsourcing by the government facing the “make or buy” de-
cision. Diﬀerences between private or public provision of goods and
services mainly depend on contract incompleteness, because the govern-
ment “cannot fully anticipate, describe, stipulate, regulate and enforce
exactly what it wants” (p. 137). According to the author, it may be
easier to write contingent contracts for public utilities than for ﬁrms
supplying education or social services. Given that quality is often non
contractible, ownership of assets is relevant because it implies residual
rights of decision. Government employees may receive weaker incentives
to reduce costs and innovate, but the high-powered incentives of private
ﬁrms in this respect may in turn have a potentially negative eﬀect on ser-
vice quality as far as hospitals and schools are concerned. Nevertheless,
even in this case, public ownership is not necessarily the optimal solu-
tion because the opportunity for consumers to switch providers coupled
with suﬃcient competition in the market may preserve the incentives to
supply high quality even in private ﬁrms. When asymmetric informa-
tion about quality prevents the competitive mechanism from working,
reputational concerns may avoid deleterious eﬀects on quality provision.
Finally Schleifer ﬁnds that, in the case of health, education and social
services, public ownership may be replaced by non-proﬁt ﬁrms that,
according to Weisbrod and Karpoﬀ (1968) can avoid reducing quality
to minimise costs, as the constraints on proﬁtd i s t r i b u t i o nm a i n t a i na n
incentive to supply high quality services.
3 Privatization and Political Economy
The original contribution by Shapiro and Willig suggested that malev-
olent public oﬃcials are hierarchically linked to a public-spirited framer
who has to decide between privatization and nationalization. Pint ex-
16amined a labor intensive public ﬁrm given that he identiﬁes the private
agenda of the (vote seeking) government with electoral support. However
at the same time he also considered a public, but politically independent
regulatory agency. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) pointed out that even if
privatization decisions may be Pareto eﬃcient from the point of view
of the society as a whole, they do not necessarily maximize political
consensus because privatization beneﬁts may be widespread, while pri-
vatization costs may simply concern a small part of the constituency, i.e.
workers of the former SOE. If only workers that fear unemployment care
about privatization and are informed about its weight in political plat-
forms, then politicians may decide not to pursue privatization policies
in order to not lose votes and be re-elected.
3.1 Politicians, Firms and Excess Employment
T h ei s s u eo fp o l i t i c a lb e n e ﬁts connected to excess employment returns
again in the analyses by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and to Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny (1996). According to such analyses, the ineﬃciency
of SOEs still depends on their distorsions towards excess employment,
but they apply a new methodological approach to studying this problem,
starting from the fact that the reduction of employment through priva-
tization cannot be trivially assumed18. Agency theory and regulatory
mechanisms are left aside while bargaining issues become more relvant.
Managers and politicians bargain over the decisions of the ﬁrm and the
politicians may try to maintain excess employment even in private ﬁrms.
Therefore one cannot automatically assume that privatization leads to
an increase in eﬃciency by reducing labor costs.
Shleifer and Vishny further analyze the distinction between owner-
ship and control of the enterprise. A continuum of ﬁrm structures can
then be considered according to the portion of shares respectively owned
by the manager (private enterpreneur serving the interests of sharehold-
ers) and by the Treasury. Therefore, in addition to pure SOEs and
private ﬁrms, one can also consider the corporatized ﬁrm, where the
transfer of control rights from the politician to the manager occurs inde-
pendently of pure privatization (implying a change of ownership rights
as well), and the regulated private ﬁrm. In the latter case, the politician
can continue to excercise control rights through regulation in order to
maintain excess employment even if the manager and private sharehold-
ers own the ﬁrm.
Reducing excess employment to reap eﬃciency gains only depends
18In fact the empirical evidence is not deﬁnitive in this respect (Megginson and
Netter, 2001).
17on a restructuring process, but privatization does not necessarily lead
to such a process. Thanks to public tranfers, the politician may in fact
try to corrrupt the private manager to maintain excess employment even
in private ﬁrms. Thus privatization does not necessarily eliminate soft
budget constraints, as Segal also shows. But according to Shleifer and
Vishny corruption can also work in the opposite manner because man-
agers can corrupt politicians with control rights in order to be free to
restructure, reduce labor costs and make greater proﬁts. Corruption
mechanisms are then represented as a Nash bargaining process enabling
parties to reach their jointly eﬃcient solution (which diﬀers of course
from the ﬁrst best) and split the related surplus. Shleifer and Vishny
are therefore able to show a new “indiﬀerence result”, the third in the
literature, regarding privatization: “with bribes, the allocation of re-
sources is independent of either the allocation of cash ﬂow rights or the
allocation of control rights over excess employment”19.
Such a result represents an application of the Coase theorem: it
shows that with full corruption, politicians and managers can reach an
eﬃcient allocation of (their) resources independently of the distribution
of control and ownership rights. However as corruption is illegal it can-
not easily be implemented. Due to strategic behavior economic agents
make their decisions in a non cooperative framework where only repu-
tation issues would eventually bind them. Therefore there are good rea-
sons to move away from the indiﬀerence result and try to show whether
privatization potentially matters when corruption cannot be fully im-
plemented. The level of excess employment (a beneﬁt for politicians
and a cost for managers) and the level of public transfer (a beneﬁtf o r
managers and eventually a cost for politicians) diﬀer in the equilibrium
with no bribes compared to the equilibrium with full corruption and
are aﬀected by the distribution of ownership and control rights. Actu-
ally Shleifer and Vishny ﬁnd that corporatization matters because when
a manager gains control of the ﬁrm, he may partially restructure and
reduce excess employment. At the same time, he can extract surplus
from politicians in the form of public transfer from the Treasury, so
that the budget constraint softens with corporatization. However pri-
vatization after corporatization does not matter because “with manager
control, the allocation in the no-bribes equilibrium is independent of
management ownership”20. To see how privatization matters in such a
framework one needs to introduce some further assumptions concerning
both the crucial relationship between politicians and the Treasury and
the cost of public transfers.
19See proposition 1 in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), p. 1006.
20See proposition 6 in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), p. 1010.
18Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) explain why privatization can
lead to restructuring by trying to resolve the following question: why
would a politician fail to buy his way to high labor spending through
subsidies to private ﬁrms? The answer lies in the cost of subsidies. Let
us denote by T the subsidy from the Treasury to the ﬁrm and by α the
share of cash ﬂow owned by the manager (private shareholders). Since
the Treasury owns (1 − α) of the cash ﬂow, it gets fraction (1 − α) of
this subsidy back. So the eﬀective subsidy is αT. If the politician could
ask the Treasury to subsidize the privatized ﬁrm at no cost for himself,
he would pay inﬁnite subsidies to obtain excess employment and no
restructuring could ever take place. But if the Treasury has to ﬁnance
subsidies by raising taxes or inﬂation - thereby taking then unpopular
decisions - the cost to politicians of making a net subsidy αT becomes
kαT21. This is added to the cost to politicians of foregoing Treasury
revenue due to excess employment, measured by m. In the model the
objective function of the politician is then given by:
Up = −m(1 − α)E + qE − kαt (6)
where E denotes the level of labor spending and q the marginal political
beneﬁt of a money unit of such a spending (q<1). The assumption
that the politician can use his control rights to choose a higher level of
employment implies m(1 − α) <q . The utility function of the manager
is given by:
Um = −αE + αT (7)
The authors say that m<kbecause it is reasonable to assume that it
is easier for politicians to squander ﬁrm’s proﬁts on ineﬃciencies than to
obtain additional subsidies for them. In reality, a minister must compete
with other politicians for Treasury resources while it is easier for him to
simply spend the proﬁts of a ﬁrm he directly controls. It is interest-
ing to notice that competition among politicians for Treasury resources
becomes ﬁercer under tight macroeconomic policies or for countries over-
whelmed by very high public debts (like Italy for example). Therefore
privatization will lead to restructuring only when the following condition
holds:
kα+ m(1 − α) >q (8)
In fact when the inequality holds the political cost of subsidies and
the ﬁnancial cost of foregone proﬁts are greater than the political bene-
21k<1, since subsidies are less costly for the politician than bribes out of his own
pocket.
19ﬁts of spending in excess employment. It is worthwhile emphasizing that
such a condition may not hold for some ﬁrms whose excess employment
is crucial for political consensus22. On the basis of these conclusions
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny distinguish between privatized ﬁrms con-
trolled by large outside investors, by their employees or by managers.
The ﬁrst ones are more likely to restrucuture as they are harder to con-
vince through subsidies to increase employment spending.
Issues regarding the separation between ownership and control and
the diﬀerence between privatization and restructuring may be crucial
when considering empirical evidence about partial privatizations. In
their survey Megginson and Netter (2001) show that ﬁrms with mixed
ownership (where the Treasury still holds a part of the stakes) are more
eﬃcient than SOEs but less eﬃcient than completely privatized ﬁrms.
Bortolotti and Faccio (2004) ﬁnd that at the end of 2000, through own-
ership or “golden shares”, governments controlled 62.4 % of privatised
ﬁrms. Surprisingly they also ﬁnd that large government stakes have
no negative eﬀects on either adjusted market value or stock price per-
formance. Therefore government reluctance to complete privatization
matters but - contrary to what is expected - large State holdings could
even positively aﬀect the market value of privatized ﬁrms. In reality, the
government “can shield privatized companies from competition, aﬀord
them a favorable regulatory environment, subsidize loans or guarantee
contracts”23. Following such a strategy the Treasury, as a shareholder,
could acquire ﬁnancial beneﬁts and use them to relax public ﬁnance con-
straints or competition among politicians for its resources or even avoid
increasing ﬁscal pressure. One cannot exclude that partially privatized
ﬁrms protected by the government could also avoid more restructuring
to preserve at least a part of the overmanning that continues to yield
political beneﬁts. Further eﬃciency gains could then require the total
r e l e a s eo fs h a r e sb yt h eT r e a s u r y .
In spite of the conventional wisdom that only considers the soft bud-
g e tc o n s t r a i n ta sac o n s e q u e n c eo fb e n e v o l e n tp o l i t i c i a n sf a c i n gac o m -
mitment problem, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer and
Vishny (1996) propose political motivations for the soft budget con-
straint by assuming political beneﬁts of excess labor in public ﬁrms.
More recently, Robinson and Torvik (2005) go a step further in this di-
rection: in their political economy model of the soft budget constraint,
political beneﬁts are not assumed to exist, but emerge as a result. Start-
22An example could be the Italian National Airline, Alitalia which continues to
receive State subsidies without signiﬁcant restructuring - even after a partial priva-
tization - and risk of bankruptcy in 2004.
23See Bortolotti and Faccio (2004), pp. 2-3.
20ing from the fact that there are asymmetries in what they can promise
to diﬀerent groups of voters, politicians can commit only to policies that
are ex post optimal for them. According to their strategy, in the ﬁrst
place they want to ﬁnance “bad” projects, “bad” ﬁrms in our idea, whose
revenues do not cover costs, if they know that only themselves will be
able to credibly reﬁnance them in the future, in this way redistributing
resources to their core supporters. The latters are then encouraged to
vote for them because they anticipate the subsequent bail out. In this
new framework politicians may desire a soft budget constraint even if
information is complete24 because of its inﬂuence on the outcome of elec-
tions. Given that bad projects produce an economic loss, they are more
likely to be implemented when the rents of being in power are high, that
is when the gain from inﬂuencing the election outcome is higher. This
generally happens in countries with ﬂawed institutions.
3.2 The Eﬃciency of Privatization Policies driven
by Political Preferences
Previous contributions introduced a separation between privatization
and restructuring decisions that could be fruitful when discussing the
impact of privatization on eﬃciency. Classical contributions to the po-
litical economy literature are more interested in the feasibility, credibility
and the distributive implications of privatization decisions whose contri-
bution to eﬃciency is simply assumed as given. Bortolotti and Pinotti
(2003) show how these classical contributions could be adapted to pri-
vatization issues. They establish that, ceteris paribus,“ m a j o r i t a r i a n ”
political systems, as opposed to “consensual-corporatist” democracies
should be more likely to privatize, because they are more competitive
and able to drive down political rents, reducing the opposition to priva-
tization decisions. The partisan dimension of privatization is explicitly
analyzed by Biais and Perotti (2002), showing that right wing politi-
cians privatize in order to gain future support from the constituency of
shareholders of newly privatized ﬁrms25. However they also show that
left wing parties can strategically make privatization decisions in order
to win future elections, but with the aim of maximizing privatization
revenues and using them to realize redistributive policies. Therefore the
24According to the theory that downplays any political reason for the existence of
soft budget constraint, if politicians knew that a project was poor, it would never
has been ﬁnanced.
25Biais and Perotti assume that conservative parties maximize the utility of the
rich while left parties maximize the utility of the poor. By allocating shares of newly
privatized companies to the middle class, the right makes the median voter averse to
the redistribution policies of the left and gains support in future elections.
21implementation of privatization decisions could also be shaped by polit-
ical preferences with conservative governments tending to privatize by
public oﬀers and left wing governments that will more frequently choose
private placements to strategic investors or share issues in international
exchanges, in order to generate higher revenues.
The political economy of privatization has been explicitly analyzed
more recently by Börner (2004). Börner also separates privatization and
restructuring decisions: the government may either privatize or restruc-
ture a SOE characterized by low productive eﬃciency. But in addition
the author compares the eﬀects of privatization and restructuring deci-
sions according to diﬀerent government preferences. When privatizing,
the government does not necessarily pursue eﬃciency aims and therefore
privatization incentives may even prove to be excessive if privatization
decisions are due to votes or revenue maximization. In these cases the
government may be led to carry out politically motivated reforms in the
short run, even if such decisions are not the best ones in the long run
according to the maximization of social welfare. Börner’s model builds
on Schmidt’s (1996a,b): both in case of privatization and in case of re-
s t r u c t u r i n gam a n a g e ri sh i r e d( b yt h ep r i v a t eo w n e r sa n db yt h eg o v e r n -
ment respectively) to invest in cost reduction activities in an incomplete
contracts setting. The manager’s rewards can only be conditioned on
proﬁts. The manager’s eﬀort e aﬀects costs stocastically because with
probability pr(e) reforms will be successful in increasing productive eﬃ-
ciency while with probability 1−pr(e) reforms will fail and the ﬁrm will
be shut down. If reforms prove to be successful the owner of the ﬁrm
determines the employment level and the output is then produced26.
If the government were a welfare maximizer it would trade-oﬀ pri-
vatization beneﬁts accruing from the enhancement of productive ef-
ﬁciency with restructuring beneﬁts deriving from the opportunity to
choose the socially optimal employment level. With privatization, the
owners choose the proﬁt maximizing employment level and this leads to
ah i g h e re ﬀort by the manager which in turn means a higher probability
that reforms will be successfull. In case of restructuring social beneﬁts
not only derive from a lower level of unemployment but also from re-
duced redistribution losses as the total cost of public funds decreases
with unemployment subsidies. Moreover a welfare oriented government
is not concerned with privatization prices as it is not interested in the dis-
tributive eﬀects of reforms. In contrast, the strategies of a voter oriented
26In case of privatization the government covers the costs of unemployment and
credibly commits to not interfere with private employment choice. In case of restruc-
turing the government chooses the employment level and internalizes the unemploy-
ment costs.
22government would be consistent with underpricing (or voucher privatiza-
tion27). In fact, a voter oriented government would aim to maximise its
chance of re-election and is attracted by the opportunity to transfer the
proﬁts of privatized ﬁrms directly to the citizens. Therefore it is rational
for it to choose the lowest possible privatization price. However restruc-
turing policies carried out within SOEs may be attractive not because
of the social cost of unemployment implied by privatization policies, but
to allow transfers to citizens to be maximized through an increase in
the total wage payments implied by a higher employment level. Finally
Börner considers the case of the “egoistic government” which maximizes
its own expected revenues (be they devoted to political projects or to the
private pockets of politicians). This kind of government is induced to
choose the highest privatization price. Instead in case of restructuring
it chooses a lower employment level compared to the welfare oriented
government thereby trying to reduce labor costs.
The analysis carried out by Börner captures the short sightness of
reforms implemented because of political preferences. Voter oriented
governments may show ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize as pri-
vatization may be the cheapest way to increase voters revenues. Alter-
natively, by restructuring SOEs this kind of government would choose
a higher than socially optimal employment level, for solely distributive
reasons. If this last eﬀect prevails, incentives to privatize would turn
o u tt ob ei n e ﬃciently low. Also egoistic governments may have an in-
eﬃciently high incentive to privatize, as they undervalue the social cost
of unemployment. From their point of view total wage payments are
o n l yac o s tl i k eu n e m p l o y m e n ts u b s i d i e s .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h el a t t e r
are lower than labor costs an egoistic government always prefers priva-
tization policies in pursuing revenue maximization. Only with better
institutional arrengements are ineﬃcient incentives to privatize reduced:
the government may induced to choose privatization more frequently
than restructuring, but such a choice results in an increase in social
welfare.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The theoretical literature about privatization and eﬃciency relies on
“indiﬀerence theorems”, claiming the ownership structure is neutral,
thereby justiﬁying privatization policies on grounds of eﬃciency when
observing neutrality failures. In their seminal contribution Sappington
and Stiglitz state that public production cannot improve upon private
27Voucher privatization, implemented in Russia and in the Czech Republic, impli-
cates the distribution of assets free to citizens. Therefore in this case the privatization
price is zero.
23production, because the government could always delegate the provision
o fag o o dt oap r i v a t eﬁrm through an auction mechanism and reach both
productive and allocative eﬃciency if an “ideal setting” prevails. To the
extent that in the real world the assumptions behind this “ideal setting”
are not respected, government intervention may be required to restore
eﬃciency. However nationalization is neither desirable nor necessary,
as the government can use a politically independent regulatory agency.
Therefore the subsequent literature compares SOEs to regulated private
ﬁrms and is built on the theory of regulation with imperfect information.
Even with incomplete information about production costs, regula-
tion could achieve ﬁrst best optimality if a transfer equivalent to the
information rent were awarded to low cost ﬁrms to prevent them from
exploiting their private information. However if public funds are costly
this regulatory mechanism is not optimal. In the “ideal setting” de-
scribed by Sappington and Stiglitz rents could be completely dissipated
within franchise auctions. The optimal regulatory mechanism found
by Baron and Myerson (1982) reduces information rents, but implies
output distorsions for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. However, assuming a malev-
olent government, incomplete information about costs may also be the
source of beneﬁts if SOEs are privatized and public intervention is put
into the hands of a malevolent regulator. To the extent that the latter
needs to resort to a regulatory mechanism àl aBaron and Myerson to
obtain cost revelation by the private manager, he will ﬁnd it more diﬃ-
cult to pursue his private agenda which is negatively aﬀected by output
distorsions. Therefore privatization may become equivalent to an infor-
mation barrier. Due to the interposition of this barrier, social welfare
can increase with privatization if malevolent ministers are transformed
into regulators. That is why the “indiﬀerence theorem” of Shapiro and
Willig claims that ownership is neutral for social welfare if private in-
f o r m a t i o no np r o ﬁtability is irrelevant or there are no costs of raising
public funds. In reality if private information is irrelevant there would
be no beneﬁts from privatization conceived as an information barrier:
SOEs and private regulated ﬁrms would be equivalent in this respect.
In contrast when the conditions for neutrality do not hold, ownership
becomes relevant and greater privatization beneﬁts are expected to ac-
crue especially to countries with ﬂawed political systems, as malevolent
governments can pursue their private agenda more easily.
If in addition one considers the incentive issues arising from agency
problems between owners and managers, only second best eﬃciency can
b er e a c h e db yb o t hS O E sa n dp r i v a t i z e dﬁrms. Governments that max-
imize the welfare of their constituencies may be (excessively) biased to-
wards labor and consumer surplus. Then managers of nationalized ﬁrms
24are expected to receive higher information rents in order to respect their
incentive compatibility constraints at larger level of output. Private reg-
ulated ﬁrms may be more eﬃcient from the productive point of view
(provided that they are regulated with price-cap mechanisms).
To the extent that previous results strongly depend on initial as-
sumptions about government behavior, privatization beneﬁts may not
appear robust in this literature. Further eﬀorts are thus being devoted
to show that privatizing and regulating formerly SOEs may increase eﬃ-
ciency even when the government behaves as a benevolent maximizer of
the social surplus. This part of the literaure no longer relies on “indiﬀer-
ence theorems”, as ownership is always important because of incomplete
contracts. When unforeseen contingencies arise, resorting to residual
control rights becomes usual in contractual relationships. Such rights
are connected to ownership, but this raises commitment issues involving
governments.
In eﬀect benevolent governments cannot commit themselves to reduce
output or even shut down ineﬃcient SOEs. As these types of govern-
ments maximize social welfare, they will always bail out SOEs in spite of
their (non credible) threats. In contrast, managers of private ﬁrms reg-
ulated àl aBaron-Myerson are adversely aﬀected by output distorsions
and increase their eﬀorts to reduce costs. Therefore allocative eﬃciency
turns out to be greater in SOEs while productive eﬃciency is higher
in regulated private ﬁrms. Contract incompleteness can further prevent
productive eﬃciency from being achieved in subsidized ﬁrms. Due to
the impossibility of granting state contingent subsidies, SOEs may even
ﬁnd it worthwhile to maintain an ineﬃcient behavior in order to contin-
uously receive ﬁnancial support from the government. However there is
no reason to exclude that even private ﬁrms may follow this behavior
because the government sometimes ﬁnancially assists them to avoid an
increase in unemployment or to protect national production vis à vis
foreign imports.
The incentives to invest may be greater in private regulated ﬁrms
because within SOEs the government cannot commit not to expropri-
ate investment beneﬁts to reach social goals. The investment decisions
of public managers are then negatively aﬀected in that they anticipate
expropriation. According to Laﬀont and Tirole, reduced incentives to
invest represent the cost of public ownership. But there is also a cost
related to private ownership. In fact, if ﬁrms are privatized and then
regulated, the manager is controlled by two principals: the sharehold-
ers and the regulatory agency. As each principal fails to internalize the
aims of the other in his objective function, the resulting ineﬃciencies
represent the cost of private ownership. No clear cut conclusions can
25therefore be drawn about the superiority of private ownership compared
to the public ownership from the eﬃciency point of view.
Assuming a completely benevolent government is probably both the
merit and the limit of the contributions based on the incomplete con-
tracts theory. These contributions are not concerned with the active
role that the goverment can play in shaping privatization policies. In
contrast, more recent papers analyze the institutional characteristics of
privatization decisions by assuming that privatization policies may be
driven by politicians’ preferences. In this case eﬃciency is aﬀected even
if political decisions pursue diﬀerent goals. The relationships between
politicians and ﬁrms are discussed in a more general framework that
includes decisions to susbidize private ﬁr m sa sw e l l .T h i sf a c tw a sa l s o
incidentally noticed also by previous contributions and has leads to con-
sider the political control of the ﬁrms that have been corporatized or
partially privatized.
Within this framework not only can politicians bribe managers to
keep excess employment within the ﬁrm, but managers can also bribe
politicans in order to be free to maximize productive eﬃciency by re-
ducing labor costs. Hence a new “indiﬀerence theorem” arises whereby
if corruption were fully allowed in political systems then the resulting
allocation of resources would be completely independent of the owner-
ship and control of the ﬁrm. Due to obvious problems in implementing
corruption, privatization may become crucial as ownership and control
matter concerning both the employment decisions inside the ﬁrm and the
distributions of subsidies by the Treasury. While privatizations do not
necessarily lead to restructuring so long as politicians can obtain bene-
ﬁts from excess employment, if government subsidies become extremely
costly due to tight monetary policies or the unsustainable ﬁscal pressure
then politicians may actually prefere restructuring as the political bur-
den of ﬁnancial losses may be too high. Then productive eﬃciency will
be positively aﬀected. This seems consistent with the recent experience
of privatization in Western European countries like Italy. Taking care
of ﬁnancial needs of the government leads to consider diﬀerent political
p r e f e r e n c e s .T h eg o v e r n m e n tm a yp r i v a t i z et om a x i m i s et h er e v e n u eo f
voters holding a share of newly privatized companies or may be “egois-
tic” and privatize simply in order to maximize its own revenues. Hence
excessive incentives to privatize can then arise, while the government
would have been better oﬀ restructuring SOEs in the short term and
considering privatization only in the long term. This in turns appears
to be consistent with privatization failures occuring in some Eastern
European countries.
The theoretical literature we surveyed is not conclusive about the
26impact of privatization policies on a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. In our opinion one
issue which has not been suﬃciently taken into account is the behavior
of bureaucrats inside SOEs. In most contributions managers of SOEs do
not appear to be very diﬀerent from managers operating private ﬁrms as
far as their objective function is concerned. Diﬀerences in performance
appear to be mostly related to diﬀerences in the objective functions of
their principals. Classical contributions regarding the analysis of bureau-
cracy (Niskanen and other scholars) should probably be considered to
shed more light on bureaucratic activities inside SOEs and make compar-
isons with private regulated ﬁrms. Moreover issues related to regulatory
capture may be even important for this comparison. The interplay be-
tween regulation and privatization as well as beween liberalization and
privatization also needs to be considered to disentangle the eﬀects due
to ownership changes from those due to regulatory activities and market
structure evolution. Finally the consequences of privatization programs
should also be investigated in a general equilibrium framework. Recent
empirical works show that governments still holding some stakes in par-
tially privatized ﬁrms can contribute to the ﬁnancial success of these
ﬁrms. When the Treasury behaves simply as a shareholder for the sake
of public ﬁn a n c ei tm a yc o n t r i b u t et oa ne x c e s s i v ev a l u a t i o no fe x - S O E s ,
like for example public utilities in the telecom or in the energy sector,
and draw capital resources away from other industrial sectors with non
negligible eﬀects on allocative eﬃciency as investments in newly priva-
tised ﬁrms may be excessive.
References
[1] Armstrong, M., Sappington, D. E. M. (2004), Recent Devel-
opments in The Theory of Regulation, forthcoming in the Hand
Book of Industrial Organization, edited by M. Armstrong and R.
Porter.
[2] Averch, H., Johnson L. (1962), Behavior of the Firm under
Regulatory Constraint, American Economic Review, 52, pp. 1052-
69.
[3] Baron, D. P., Myerson, R. (1982), Regulating a monopolist
with unknown costs, Econometrica,v o l .5 0 ,p p .9 1 1 - 3 0 .
[4] Biais, B., Perotti, E. C. (2002), Machiavellian privatization,
American Economic Review, 92, pp. 240-58.
[5] Boardman, A. E., Vining, A. R. (1992), Ownership Versus
Competition: The Causes of Government Enterprise Ineﬃciency,
Public Choice, 73:2, p.p. 205-39.
[6] Börner, K. (2004), The Political Economy of Privatization: Why
Do Governments Want Reforms?, Nota di Lavoro 106.2004, Fon-
27dazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[7] Bortolotti, B., Faccio, M. (2004), Reluctant Privatization,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper 04-37.
[8] Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M., Siniscalco, D. (2003), Privati-
zation around the world: new evidence from panel data, Journal of
Public Economics,8 8 ,p p .3 0 5 - 3 2 .
[9] Bortolotti, B., Pinotti, P. (2003), The Political Economy of
Privatization, Nota di Lavoro 45.2003, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mat-
tei.
[10] Bortolotti, B., Siniscalco, D. (2004), The Challenges of Pri-
vatization. An International Analysis, Oxford University Press.
[11] Bös, D. (1991), Privatization. A Theoretical Treatment,C l a r e n d o n
Press Oxford.
[12] B o y c k o ,M . ,S h l e i f e r ,A . ,V i s h n y ,R .W .(1996), A Theory
of Privatization, The Economic Journal, 106, pp. 309-19.
[13] Grossman, S. J., Hart, O. D. (1986), The Costs and Beneﬁts of
Ownership: A Theory of Verical and Lateral Integration, Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 691-719.
[14] Hart, O. D. (1983), The Market Mechanism as an Incentive
Scheme, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, pp. 366-82.
[15] Kornai, J. (1986), The soft budget constraint, Kyklos,v o l .3 9 ,p p .
3-30.
[16] Laffont, J.-J. (1995), Industrial Policy and Politics,m i m e o ,I n -
stitut d’Economie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de
Toulouse.
[17] Laffont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (1986), Using Cost Observation to
Regulate Firms, Journal of Political Economy,9 4 ,p p .6 1 4 - 4 1 .
[18] - - (1991), Privatization and Incentives, Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, vol. 7, pp. 84-105.
[19] Loeb, M., Magat, W. (1979), A decentralized method for utility
regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, pp. 399-404.
[20] Lülfesmann, C. (2002), Benevolent Government, Managerial In-
centives, and the Virtues of Privatization, Nota di Lavoro 77.2002,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[21] Megginson, W. L., Netter, J. M. (2001), From State to Mar-
ket: A survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, Journal of
Economic Literature, vol. XXXIX, pp. 321-89.
[22] Pint, E. M. (1991), Nationalization vs. regulation of monopolies:
the eﬀect of ownership on eﬃciency, Journal of Public Economics,
44, pp. 131-64.
[23] Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R. (2005), A Political Economy Theory
of the Soft Budget Constraint, Harvard Research Paper.
28[24] Sappington, D. E. M., Stiglitz, J. E. (1987), Privatization,
Information and Incentives, Journal of Policy Analysis and Man-
agement,v o l .6 ,n .4 ,p p .5 6 7 - 8 2 .
[25] Schmidt, K. M. (1996a), The Costs and Beneﬁts of Privatization-
An Incomplete-Contracts Approach, Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 12, pp. 1-24.
[26] - - (1996b), Incomplete Contracts and Privatization, European Eco-
nomic Review, 40, pp. 569-79.
[27] Segal, I. (1998), Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint, RAND
Journal of Economics, 29, pp. 596-609.
[28] Shapiro, C., Willig, R. D. (1990), Economic Rationales for the
Scope of Privatization, in Suleiman, E. N., Waterbury, J.(eds),
The Political Economy of Private Sector Reform and Privatization,
Boulder: Westview Press.
[29] Sheshinski, E., Lopez-Calva, L. F. (2003), Privatization and
Its Beneﬁts: Theory and Evidence, CESifo Economic Studies, vol.
49, pp. 429-59.
[30] Shirley, M. M., Walsh, P. (2004), Public versus Private Own-
ership: The current State of the Debate,T h eW o r l dB a n k .
[31] Shleifer, A. (1998), State versus Private Ownership, Journal of
Economic Perspectives,v o l .1 2 ,4 ,p p .1 3 3 - 5 0 .
[32] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W. (1994), Politicians and Firms,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, pp. 995-1025.
[33] Vickers, J., Yarrow, G. (1988), Privatization. An Economic
Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
[34] Weisbrod, B., Karpoff, P. (1968), Monetary returns to col-
lege education, students ability, and college quality, Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 50, pp. 491-7.
[35] Yarrow, G. (1986), Privatization in Theory and Practice, Eco-
nomic Policy, vol.2.
29A Appendix 1
Let us start by considering a regulatory agency that has to implement a
cost-reﬂective price regulation with imperfect information about the cost
parameter θ of a monopolist. For the sake of simplicity let θ ∈ [θ1,θ 2]
represents the distribution of cost parameter (θ2 >θ 1). With complete
information about the cost parameter the regulator could implement a
ﬁrst best regulation scheme by setting pk = θk, k =1 ,2.I ft h i ss a m er e g -
u l a t i o ns c h e m ew e r ei m p l e m e n t e dw i t hi m p e r f e c ti n f o r m a t i o nt h eﬁrm
with type θ1 could strategically declare a cost parameter θ2 to obtain
an information rent equivalent to the area A + B in Figure 2. In this
case the output produced would only be z2 , with a social cost corre-
sponding to the eﬃciency loss represented by area C. To eliminate this
loss the regulator could implement the regulation scheme by Loeb and
Magat (1979) and promise the regulated ﬁrm of type θ1 that it will pay
at r a n s f e rT1 = A+B equivalent to its information rent, when declaring
θ = θ1. In fact, such a regulatory scheme is incentive compatible for the
type θ1 ﬁrm as it should produce output z1 to cash the transfer T1,s o
that a ﬁrst best allocation can be obtained. However such a scheme is
not optimal when the social welfare function includes the cost of rais-
ing public funds or when it gives more weight to the consumer surplus
than to the producer surplus. In this case transfers paid to regulated
ﬁrms should be minimized to reach optimality28. The regulatory scheme
by Baron and Myerson actually reaches this result. According to this
scheme, the type θ2 ﬁrm subscribes a regulatory contract whereby it can
set p
0
2 >θ 2 to produce output z0
2 with a transfer T2 < 0, so that the proﬁt
margin related to pricing above marginal costs is exactly compensated
by the negative transfer (equivalent to a lump-sum tax) as T2 = D. Such
a regulatory contract implements a second best allocation, as output is
distorted for the high cost ﬁrm, and a social cost equivalent to area E
persists. However in the meantime it reduces the transfer that should
be paid to the low cost ﬁrm to avoid its strategic behaviour vis à vis
the regulator. The optimal contract for type θ1 ﬁrm includes p1 = θ1
(to produce the ﬁrst best output z1) and a transfer T1 = A<A+ B.
Therefore the information rent left to the low cost ﬁrm is reduced com-
pared to the solution proposed by Loeb and Magat (1979): even if this
ﬁrm should strategically declare a cost parameter θ2 it could collect a
surplus only equivalent to area A, given that the optimal contract for
the high cost ﬁrm allows pricing above marginal cost, but compensates
the proﬁt margin with an equivalent transfer T2 = D<0.
28Alternatively this rent could be extracted through franchise auctions as suggested
by Sappington and Stiglitz (1989).
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